Opinion: 3 ways Trump’s return to power could unfold for Ukraine

Donald Trump should be pleased. Not only is he on his way back to the White House, but he could return as one of the most powerful U.S. presidents in decades: The Supreme Court aligns with his vision, the Republican Party has been reshaped around loyalty, and both the Senate and (probably) the House are red. He even won the once-elusive popular vote.
Moreover, since he’s constitutionally barred from running again, there’s little stopping Trump from implementing his wildest visions. There is value in having a “strong vertical” — the ability to make quick decisions and turn them into actions.
Consider how U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration struggled to push the Ukraine aid bill through a Republican-controlled House. This challenge would have likely been worse under Kamala Harris, who would have faced Ukraine support being politicized against her — held hostage by an adversarial Senate and/or House to extract politically painful concessions.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, that’s where the good news likely ends. Trump and his proxies have shown a mix of skepticism and hostility toward continued aid to Ukraine. Figures like Elon Musk, who once helped Ukraine with Starlink, have shifted to anti-Ukraine rhetoric on social media. U.S. Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has publicly argued that Taiwan matters more to the U.S. than Ukraine.
Fortunately, Trump’s public statements are unreliable indicators of his policy plans. Information about his private conversations and views, including from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, provides a bit more insight — but not by much.
In short, Trump wants Russia to stay neutral in a potential U.S.-China conflict, and to secure that he may push for territorial and political concessions from Ukraine. Ideally, he would like Ukraine to neither win nor lose. On a positive note, some reports even hint at consistent, or even increased, military support for Ukraine, if only to ramp up U.S. defense industry capacity for the Pacific.
The problem is that Russia currently has the upper hand and would likely reject any deal that leaves a viable Ukraine. The U.S. has few tools to effectively pressure Russia, and China would probably increase support for Moscow to keep it in its orbit.
Nor does this look promising for Kyiv. A bad peace deal could trigger elections and internal chaos as blame shifts to the surface. It could also open borders, prompting mass male emigration. With a weakened Ukraine and a West distracted by emerging crises, Russia would likely seize the opportunity to attack again.
Fortunately for Ukraine, it may not be an immediate priority for Trump. Upon entering office, his focus will be split across numerous domestic issues, starting with his own legal battles. Trump faces four high-stakes cases — likely to be delayed or dismissed, but still requiring time and attention.
Then there’s the U.S. debt ceiling. U.S. debt service costs reached a record $1.2 trillion in the fiscal year ending in October 2024 — more than military spending. The current debt ceiling suspension expires on Jan. 2, 2025, just before a new Congress is sworn in on Jan. 3 and Trump’s inauguration on Jan. 20.
This issue is more than the headache of starting the presidency with a government shut down. Trump’s proposed tax cuts and spending promises will increase national debt, a concern for his Silicon Valley supporters, while further fueling inflation. Rising living costs drove many of his supporters to vote for him, creating tough trade-offs — especially with tariffs, which are inherently inflationary.
Ironically, Trump could try to control energy prices, either by releasing reserves or pressing Saudi Arabia to do so — which might impact Russia more than any direct support for Ukraine.
Finally, there are domestic issues including abortion restrictions, reshaping political institutions (the infamous “Project 2025”), and immigration. Talk of mass deportations may follow a similar path as the “Trump Wall” after 2016 — taking years to implement and ultimately proving largely symbolic. Though he may appear all-powerful on paper, the radical wing of his party, including the so-called Freedom Caucus, holds blocking power, which he will need to manage.
In brief, Trump will likely delegate Ukraine to an envoy — either due to domestic demands or a realization that there’s no easy win. Possible figures for this role include ex-acting Director of National Intelligence Richard Grenell (also Trump’s envoy to Serbia-Kosovo in 2019-2021), ex-National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, or ex-CIA head and ex-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Ukraine’s negotiation position is weak and worsening, which would impact the terms of any potential deal. Indeed, the current Russian offensive — which recently saw the largest weekly territorial gain this year — appears timed to strengthen Moscow’s position before Trump’s inauguration.
Kyiv’s likely strategy will be to engage with Trump’s envoy and try to show Ukraine as a promising business opportunity, that supporting it demonstrates strength, and that they can deliver a win under the right conditions (as Zelensky’s recent statement about “peace through strength” suggests). Engaging parts of Trump’s base, including evangelicals and isolationists, will also be crucial. Russia, with a better ground game in Washington, will lobby both and leverage or even create crises involving the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Realistically, Kyiv senses this may mean “delivering deals” for Trump’s inner circle. It’s no coincidence that Zelensky and others emphasize Ukraine’s potential in lithium, titanium, gold, uranium, and gas production.
Ukraine will likely try to maintain control over the peace process by pushing for a second peace summit, potentially set around the three-year anniversary of the full-scale invasion. Whether this works is uncertain.
The most probable scenario is a partial U.S. disengagement, leaving Europe to fill the gap. This could unfold in three broad directions:
Stagnation in U.S. support, Europe steps up: Trump might attempt a Ukraine-Russia peace deal, but Russia could reject any terms allowing a viable Ukraine, demanding more territory or internal changes. Recognizing there’s no clear win, Trump may disengage, maintaining only minimal support.
Europe would likely need to increase support, potentially deploying boots on the ground for training or later, for combat. While politically challenging, some Nordic countries might lead the way, potentially joined by Poland and Czechia. This support could keep Ukraine fighting until late 2025, by which point Russia’s resources may deplete, forcing it to accept terms that leave Ukraine viable.
A forced ceasefire in early 2025: Trump could bring Russia to the table and propose terms that Ukraine might accept, such as freezing the conflict at the current front lines and offering security guarantees short of NATO, potentially incorporating elements similar to South Korea’s security arrangement.
A ceasefire would prompt Ukrainian elections and, depending on the terms and promised reconstruction funds, either stability or chaos. There would also probably be a mass exodus of men.
The main challenge of this scenario is that terms that leave Ukraine viable and able to rebuild are unacceptable to Russia. Moscow would only accept these terms if it sees them leading to Western disengagement and internal Ukrainian chaos — creating an opening to attack again after Ukraine demobilizes and internal divisions deepen.
Ukrainian collapse: If Trump disengages entirely and Europe can’t compensate for the loss, Ukraine faces economic and military collapse. Manpower shortages, ongoing attrition, and limited financial resources could create a vicious cycle.
This scenario, while distant, is possible. The unpredictability of Trump’s presidency leaves open the chance of significantly more support for Ukraine. But the harsh truth is that this is unlikely, and both Ukraine and Europe need strong contingency plans.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.